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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Khrushchev's Baku and Supreme Soviet Speeches and Personnel Changes in the Soviet Union

While there seems to have been divergent immediate causes which resulted in Khrushchev's Baku speech and his Supreme Soviet statements, they appear to have in common a belief on his part that the Summit will not be as fruitful from his point of view as he originally hoped. In this sense they seem to have been designed to throw on to the Western powers, and in particular the United States, the onus for failure at the conference. The Baku speech was in part a response to recent speeches by State Department officials, and also undoubtedly to General de Gaulle's dismissal of the importance of the German and Berlin issues in his statements in Canada and elsewhere. This view is borne out by the fact that chief emphasis in his Baku speech was placed on the reiteration of his standard position on Berlin.

The tone, and indeed anger, of his Supreme Soviet speech was undoubtedly affected by the plane incident. Throughout Bolshevik history there has been a pathological concern over the sanctity of their frontiers and airspace and any breach in this respect has produced a wholly irrational response. This we believe accounts for the tone of his Supreme Soviet address, and in particular the ill-tempered and offensive references to the United States, and especially to the Vice President. Apart from this, however, the speech fits into the general line referred to above of placing the blame in advance on the Western powers for any failure at the Summit. In this connection it should be mentioned that Ambassador

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Menshikov about a month ago, obviously under specific instructions, was endeavoring to find out through private contacts with Government officials and influential private citizens the prospects for success at the Summit.

We see no relevance whatsoever in the recent Party and governmental personnel changes in Moscow. They seem to have no major political significance in either regard to domestic or foreign policy but rather are a more effective utilization of trusted personnel.

In summary, we consider that these two speeches of Khrushchev indicate the pessimistic Soviet attitude toward the Summit and possibly some concern on Khrushchev's part of the damaging effect that failure to achieve anything substantial might have on his standing and prestige.

/S/ DOUGLAS DILLON

Acting Secretary



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